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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
SUSAN TRIPP, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060972-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for automobile homicide, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (West 2004). This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the blood draw of defendant violate her Fourth Amendment rights? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed 
for correctness, including its application of the law to the facts. State v. Brake, 2004 
UT 95,115,103 P.3d 699. The trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed 
for clear error. State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94,1f 11,100 P.3d 1222. 
2. Did the trial court properly deny a proposed defense instruction that the 
jury should consider whether the victim's conduct was the superseding cause of the 
fatal accident? 
Standard of Review. Challenges to jury instructions are reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Powell, 2007 UT 9,111, 154 P.3d 788. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 23, 2004, defendant was involved in an automobile-motorcycle 
accident that resulted in the death of Daniel Pracht— the driver of the motorcycle. R. 
3-4. Defendant was charged with automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(1) (West 2004), and failure to yield the right 
of way, a class C misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-72.10(3) (West 
2004). R. 2-4. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence from a blood draw taken 
at the scene of the accident, arguing that (1) her consent was involuntary, and (2) the 
blood draw was not supported by probable cause and exigent circumstances. R. 36-
2 
58. Following an evidentiary hearing, submission of written memoranda, and oral 
argument, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 60-62,65-146,157-63. After 
a four-day trial, a jury found defendant guilty of both counts as charged. R. 248-57, 
299. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years for 
automobile homicide and a concurrent jail sentence of 90 days for failure to yield, 
but suspended imposition of the sentence and placed defendant on supervised 
probation for 36 months. R. 397-400. As part of probation, the court ordered that 
defendant serve 360 days in jail with no early release, complete 200 hours of 
community service, receive substance abuse treatment, and pay full and complete 
restitution. R. 397-400,452-53. Defendant timely appealed. R. 409-10. Defendant 
filed a Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause, but the motion was denied. R. 411-
19,442. Two months later, defendant moved for early release from jail to care for 
her mother, who was dying from pancreatic cancer. R. 449-51, 522-23. The court 
granted defendant's motion on a number of conditions, including that she wear an 
ankle monitor, drive no vehicle, reside at her mother's home, and return to jail 
within two days after the funeral of her mother. R. 520-21. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Fatal Accident 
At 6:53 p.m. on April 23, 2004, 9-1-1 dispatch received a call reporting an 
automobile-motorcycle accident at the intersection of Old Bingham Highway and 
Highway U-lll . R. 533: 4, 9-10, 57. When Officer Doug Saunders arrived at the 
scene some 10 to 15 minutes later, medical personnel were already attending to the 
motorcyclist, Daniel Pracht, who was lying on the roadway in critical condition. R. 
533: 4-6, 8, 39-40. Defendant, the driver of the automobile, was sitting in another 
vehicle smoking a cigarette. R. 533:11-12,16,40-41,43,48-49,64-65, 77,85,89. She 
was crying and visibly shaken. R. 533:43,48,52. Defendant's husband had already 
arrived at the scene and was consoling her as she sat in the car. R. 533:40-41,43,48, 
51, 76. After Officer Saunders's arrival, defendant's son and some friends also 
arrived on the scene to support her. R. 533: 48, 76. Victim advocates Cecelia Budd 
and Diane Grieves arrived at approximately 7:30 p.m. and offered their support to 
defendant. R. 533: 75-77,83. Advocate Budd remained with defendant throughout 
the accident investigation. R. 533: 76, 82-83. 
Officer Saunders approached defendant and asked her what happened. R. 
533: 42-43. She told the officer that she was traveling eastbound on the Old 
Bingham Highway and stopped for the stop sign at the U-ll l intersection. R. 533: 
57, 59. She said that after stopping, she pulled out and collided with Mr. Pracht, 
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who was traveling southbound on U-111. R. 533:57. She told Officer Saunders that 
she did not see Pracht until she saw him and his motorcycle "sliding down the 
road" in her rear view mirror. R. 533: 57. 
Attempts to Obtain Consent for a Blood Draw 
Although he did not smell the odor of alcohol or observe any indicia of 
impairment,1 Officer Saunders asked defendant whether she had consumed any 
alcohol or was on any prescription medications. R. 533:43-44,46,51-53. She denied 
any such use. R. 533: 44, 52. Officer Saunders believed he could compel her to 
submit to a blood draw due to the seriousness of the accident, but did not do so. R. 
533: 55. Instead, he asked for defendant's consent. R. 533: 44, 46-47, 52. She 
responded that "she didn't like needles and did not want to take the test." R. 533: 
44,47, 53. She offered to submit to a urinalysis instead. R. 533: 44-45,47, 54. 
Detective Daniel Roberts, an automobile homicide investigator, arrived at the 
scene just after 8:00 p.m. — as the Life Flight helicopter was leaving for the hospital. 
R. 533: 7-9. Officer Saunders informed Detective Roberts that defendant had agreed 
to submit to a urinalysis but was unwilling to submit to a blood draw because she 
1
 When Officer Joseph Monson saw defendant at approximately 8:00 p.m. she 
was crying. R. 533: 64. He did not notice that defendant had any trouble walking to 
Officer Roberts's patrol car, nor did he detect any odor of alcohol on her person. R. 
533: 69-70. 
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was afraid of needles. R. 533:12-13,45. After discussing the advantages of a blood 
test over urinalysis, the two officers determined that they would again try to obtain 
defendant's consent for a blood draw. R. 533:10-12,45-46, 54-56. 
Detective Roberts asked defendant for her consent but defendant again 
refused, citing her fear of needles and offering to give a urine sample instead. R. 
533: 12-13, 65, 70. Using a normal tone of voice, Detective Roberts discussed the 
need for a blood draw. R. 533:11-12,16, 64. He explained the seriousness of the 
situation, that Pracht was expected to die shortly, and that "the fear of needles was 
something that [they] could work around." R. 533:13. He explained that the "blood 
technician [was] very good" and that, in his experience, "he does it very quickly" 
and "rather painlessly." R. 533: 14. He said that he "thought that [they] could 
address that, [and] that the fear of needles was minor compared to the totality of the 
circumstances [they] were looking at." R. 533:14. Defendant said she "would give 
[him] blood ... as long as [they] didn't use a needle to get it." R. 533:12-13. Officer 
Roberts responded that he did not know how to obtain a sample without using a 
needle and asked if she knew of any other way. R. 533:13. She did not. See R. 533: 
13. 
When the officer's attempt to obtain consent proved unsuccessful, he left 
defendant with the victim advocates to see if they could get her to "become more 
relaxed to the idea of having a blood draw." R. 533:14-15. Officer Roberts returned 
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to visit with defendant twice more,"trying to convince her to overcome her fear of 
the needles." R. 533:15,17. But "the more [he and others] tried to convince her, the 
more defiant she became." R. 533:17. Defendant's family became verbally upset 
and began interfering with the officers, telling them what they could and could not 
do. R. 533:17,72-74. After Officer Roberts's third attempt to obtain consent failed, 
he advised defendant that he was taking her into custody, escorted her to the 
backseat of his patrol car, and told her that he would obtain a warrant to force a 
blood draw. R. 533:16-18,71,78,100. Advocate Budd sat with defendant inside the 
patrol car, but defendant's family and friends were not permitted to remain with 
her. R. 533: 71-72, 78, 88. 
The Blood Draw 
Brian Davis, the blood technician, arrived at the scene soon after defendant 
was placed into custody. R. 533: 18, 91. Apologizing to Davis, Officer Roberts 
explained that defendant had refused to submit to a blood draw, that "it looked like 
it was going to take ... a couple of hours to get the warrant," and that he would "call 
him back once [he] obtained the warrant." R. 533:18, 99-100. When Davis learned 
that defendant's reluctance stemmed from her fear of needles, he responded, "[I]f 
that's all it is, let me talk to her. I'm pretty good at getting them to work around 
their fear of needles." R. 533: 18, 91-92. Officer Roberts acquiesced to Davis's 
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request and escorted him to the patrol car where defendant was sitting. R. 533:18, 
79. 
When Davis asked defendant to submit to a blood draw, she was very upset 
and told Davis that she was terrified of needles. R. 533: 79-80, 87, 93-94. She 
explained that even her doctor would not draw blood from her because of her fear 
of needles. R. 533: 93. Davis tried to reassure her that he was very good and that it 
was really not that hard. R. 533: 93. But defendant "insist[ed] that she was very 
afraid of needles, [and] that she wanted her husband to come over and reassure her 
through this process/' R. 533: 93. Paraphrasing portions of the DUI admonition 
given by officers, Davis explained that defendant had the right to refuse a blood 
draw, the right to counsel, and the right to remain silent. R. 533: 93, 102. After 
speaking with defendant, Davis believed he "could probably get around [her] fear 
of needles/' R. 533: 93,102. He returned to Officer Roberts and told him that he 
believed "we can probably go ahead and do this. We've got her reassured and 
talked into this but I need to have an officer come with me to witness the process." 
R. 533: 94; R. 533: 66. 
Accompanied by Officer Monson, Davis returned to the patrol car where 
defendant awaited his return. R. 533: 66-67,94,96. Davis said, "You know, just let 
me put the tourniquet on your arm, see if we can find a spot that would be easy to 
do this." R. 533: 94-95. Although defendant appeared frightened, she responded, 
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"Okay, we'll go ahead and do that/7 R. 533: 67,71,95. Though she pulled her body 
away, defendant "stuck her arm out for [Davis]." R. 533: 67, 80-81, 87, 95. Davis 
then told her that it was an easy site and they could "go ahead and [take] care of 
[it]." R. 533: 95. Defendant did not object. R. 533: 95, 97. As Davis prepared to 
make the blood draw, advocate Budd tried to calm defendant down. R. 533:80. She 
told defendant that she had seen Davis do blood draws before, that he was good 
and fast, and assured her that he would be very gentle. R. 533: 88. She held her 
hand and advised her to take a deep breath and to not look at the needle. R. 533:80-
81, 88, 95. Davis quickly drew the blood. R. 533: 95, 97. 
When advocate Budd told defendant that it was done, she replied in surprise, 
"It's done?" R. 533: 81. After the blood draw, she became "very, very calm." R.533: 
81; R. 533: 67-68. When Davis left, defendant commented to advocate Budd that "it 
wasn't as bad as she thought." R. 533: 81. 
Indicia of Impairment 
The longer Officer Roberts visited with defendant, the more concerned he 
became that she was impaired. R. 533:14. When he first observed defendant, he 
noticed that her eyes were red and that she was shaking and nervous. R. 533:11. 
The officer assumed that defendant's red eyes were the result of crying, but he did 
not see any tears. R. 533:11. As he spoke with defendant over the next 45 minutes 
to an hour, Officer Roberts observed that the redness did not dissipate as he would 
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expect if it had been caused from crying. R. 533: 14, 36-37.2 Although the eyes 
cleared up, the redness remained. R. 533: 36. Officer Roberts also noted that 
defendant was smoking continually and seemed unconcerned about the victim. R. 
533:14. 
When advocate Budd first arrived on the scene and poked her head into the 
car to see how defendant was doing, she smelled the odor of alcohol, but could not 
tell whether it was coming from defendant. R. 533: 76, 83. However, when she 
joined defendant in the patrol car, she could smell the odor of alcohol emanating 
from defendant's person. R. 533: 78-79, 86-87. She also noticed that defendant 
slurred her words, but admitted she was unfamiliar with the way defendant 
normally speaks. R. 533: 84. Budd reported to officers that she smelled the alcohol. 
R. 533: 84. Brian Davis also smelled "a slight odor of alcohol" emanating from 
defendant's breath while doing the blood draw. R. 533: 96-97,100-01. In addition, 
he noticed some "train of thought issues" but "attributed that to panic ... in the 
situation." R. 533: 97,101. 
2
 However, advocate Budd indicated that defendant's emotions were like a 
roller coaster, at times becoming very upset and crying "uncontrollably." R. 533: 
77
 f 82. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Blood Draw. Defendant's initial refusal was based on her fear of needles, 
not on an objection to a blood analysis. When the blood technician spoke with 
defendant, he resolved her fears and she voluntarily consented to the blood draw. 
Her consent was not the product of a prior police illegality. She was in lawful 
custody —police had probable cause to believe that she was guilty of automobile 
homicide. She had failed to yield the right of way to the victim, her eyes remained 
red for an extended period of time, and the officer thus suspected impairment. In 
any event, any taint from an alleged unlawful detention was purged by the blood 
technician's admonition that she had the right to counsel and the right to refuse the 
test. Moreover, the blood evidence would have inevitably been obtained pursuant 
to a warrant because the officer testified he would have sought a warrant but for her 
consent and would have learned from others that defendant also had the smell of 
alcohol on her person. Given the fatal accident, the blood draw was also justified 
under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 
Superceding Cause. The victim's alleged speeding, failure to wear a helmet, 
and improper braking could not constitute superseding causes of his death. 
Accordingly, defendant was not entitled to an instruction on superseding cause. In 
any event, the instructions, as given, allowed him to argue his theory of the case. 
11 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE BLOOD DRAW OF DEFENDANT DID NOT VIOLATE HER 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
The trial court concluded that"defendant voluntarily consented to [the] blood 
draw" and thus ruled that "[t]he evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw 
[was] admissible." R. 160, ^ 2-3. On appeal, defendant claims that the blood draw 
violated her Fourth Amendment rights, arguing that the consent was not voluntarily 
given and was, in any event, the product of an unlawful arrest. Aplt. Brf. at 7-24. 
Defendant's claim fails.3 
Defendant claims that the blood draw also violated her rights under article I, 
section 14, of the Utah Constitution, but has not offered any independent argument 
or analysis for a different standard. See Aplt. Brf. at 14-15. Accordingly, this Court 
should not address her state constitutional claim. See State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 
269, \ 4 n.l , 987 P.2d 1284 (refusing to address state constitutional claim where 
defendant provided no independent authority, analysis, or argument"). 
In part LA of her brief, defendant challenges several findings of fact as clearly 
erroneous. Aplt. Brf. at 7-13. Most of these challenges, however, do not claim the 
finding is unsupported by the record, but rather that it does not include other facts 
in evidence. Defendant may, of course, rely on other undisputed evidence in the 
record of the suppression hearing in challenging the trial court's ruling on the 
motion. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, If 1 n.l , 122 P.3d 506 (holding that 
because "search and seizure cases are 'highly fact dependent/ ... the trial court's 
factual findings are supplemented with relevant, objective facts gleaned from 
testimony given during the evidentiary hearing"), rev'd on other grounds, U.S. , 
126 S.Ct. 1943 (2006). The State addresses these challenges where relevant in its 
discussion of the blood draw. 
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In State v. Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court held that a consent search "is valid 
only if '(1) [t]he consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained 
by police exploitation of [a] prior illegality/77 2002 UT 125, ^ 47, 63 P.3d 650 
(citations omitted). "If the court determines that the consent was not voluntary, no 
further analysis is required: the consent is invalid, and the preferred evidence must 
be excluded/7 State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993). If the court 
concludes that the consent was voluntary, the court must determine whether the 
consent was the product of a prior police illegality. Id. at 1263. If not, the consent is 
valid and the preferred evidence is admissible. 
A, Defendant voluntarily consented to the blood draw. 
When the voluntariness of a consent is challenged, the court must examine the 
"totality of all the circumstances77 to determine whether the consent was "the 
product of duress or coercion, express or implied.77 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 4tl2 
U.S. 218,227 (1973); accord Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at H 56-57; State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 
99, If If 45,47, 37 P.3d 1073. To be voluntary, "a person's will cannot be overborne, 
nor may 'his capacity for self-determination [be] critically impaired/77 Hansen, 2002 
UT 125, at 57 (brackets in original) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225). "[I]f under 
all the circumstances it.. . appear [s] that the consent was not given voluntarily — that 
it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful 
authority—then ...the consent [is] invalid ..,.77 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233. 
13 
In reviewing the circumstances surrounding a consent, "a court should 
carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, and the characteristics of the 
defendant/' Id. at f^ 56. Police conduct tending to show a coerced consent include a 
"claim of authority to search/7 an "exhibition of force," or the "use of deception or 
trick." Id. at f 57 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Evidence that police 
exploited a defendant's "minimal schooling, [or] low intelligence" also tend to show 
coercion. Id. (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248).4 In contrast, "a mere request to 
search" or a suspect's "cooperation" with police tend to show voluntariness. Id. 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Additionally, notice to defendant that 
he or she has the right to refuse consent also " 'presents] a stronger case for a 
finding of voluntariness.'" Id. at % 59 (citation omitted). A review of all the 
surrounding circumstances supports the trial court's conclusion that defendant's 
consent was voluntary. 
4
 In Colorado v. Connelly, the United States Supreme Court clarified that 
although the physical characteristics of the accused is relevant, "coercive police 
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary.'" 
479 U.S. 157,167 (1986). In other words, a confession is rendered involuntary only if 
"police exploited [a suspect's] weakness with coercive tactics." Id. at 165. Because 
the Supreme Court in Schneckloth applied the same voluntariness test to consent 
cases that it applies in confession cases, Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223-29, Connelly's 
holding likewise applies to consent cases. 
14 
When asked for consent to submit to a blood draw, defendant told officers 
that they "could test her blood if they did not use a needle." R. 157,1f 2; R. 533:12-
13. She refused the blood test "based solely on her fear of needles." R. 158, f 3. 
These facts are not disputed. See Aplt. Brf. at 7-14. Defendant, therefore, was not 
opposed to a blood analysis but only to the method by which the blood would be 
obtained. Where defendant expressed no objections to a blood analysis, the officers 
efforts to assuage her fear of needles was reasonable. 
Officer Roberts repeatedly tried to alleviate defendant's fears but was 
unsuccessful. R. 533:11-17. When defendant's family began to interfere with the 
investigation by telling defendant "not to answer the [officers'] questions" and that 
police "couldn't take the blood," Officer Roberts told defendant that "she was in 
custody[,] removed her from the vicinity of her family ... to the back of [his] 
unmarked patrol car," and informed her that he was "going to obtain a warrant" to 
"force the blood draw." R. 533:16-17,28-29. On appeal, defendant characterizes the 
officer's statement as a threat to coerce her consent, asserting that Officer Roberts 
"demanded that she submit to the blood test" and told her that he "would get a 
warrant and take her blood by force if she did not submit/' Aplt. Brf. at 20, 22 
(emphasis added). This is a mischaracterization of the testimony. No demand was 
made. Instead, the officer repeatedly attempted to obtain her consent. Nor was the 
reference to a warrant in the nature of a threat. At no time did the officer indicate 
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that he would get a warrant "if she did not submit." He simply abandoned his 
efforts to obtain consent and, in response to her family's insistence that she not 
answer questions and that police could not take her blood, informed her that he 
would get a warrant. See R. 533:17-18. 
Brian Davis, the blood technician, arrived on the scene shortly after defendant 
was placed in the unmarked car. Officer Roberts told him he would have to call him 
back when they obtained a warrant because defendant had refused because of her 
fear of needles. Davis responded that he was "usually pretty good at getting 
[people] to work around their fear of needles" and asked Officer Roberts to let him 
make an attempt to get her to consent. R. 533: 18, 92. When Officer Roberts 
acquiesced, Davis approached defendant and asked for consent. Defendant, 
however, was still "very reticent" because of her fear of needles. R. 533: 93. Davis 
spoke with defendant for several minutes in an effort to reassure her and obtain her 
consent. R. 533: 93-94. In doing so, he also advised her that she had the right to 
counsel, the right to remain silent, and the right to refuse the blood draw. R. 533:93-
94,102. He told her that "[i]t's a decision she had to make on her own." R. 533: 93. 
After about ten minutes of conversation, Davis believed he had reassured defendant 
sufficiently to obtain her consent. R. 533: 93-94. Davis then left defendant and told 
Officer Roberts that "we got her reassured and talked into this." R. 533: 94. 
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After speaking with Officer Roberts, Davis returned to defendant and said, 
"You know, just let me put the tourniquet on your arm, see if we can find a spot that 
would be easy to do this." R. 533: 94-95. Though still frightened, defendant 
responded, "Okay, we'll go ahead and do that." R. 533: 95. "At that point," and 
with the reassurance of the victim advocate, "she stuck her arm out for [Davis]." R. 
533: 95. After rolling up her sleeve and applying the tourniquet, Davis said to 
defendant, "[I]t's an easy site, we can go ahead and take care of this." R. 533: 95. 
Defendant did not protest and did not withdraw her arm. See R. 533: 89, 95. At 
that point, Davis inserted the needle in her arm and quickly withdrew the blood. R. 
533:95. "When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm and 
stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be." R. 159:117. 
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court's finding that "defendant 
voluntarily extended her arm" when asked for consent, R. 189: f^ 15, "is clearly 
erroneous in reflecting that [she] extended her arm to [Davis] in response to his 
asking if she would consent to the blood draw." Aplt. Brf. at 12. She contends that 
the evidence establishes only that she extended her arm in response to the blood 
tech's request to put on a tourniquet "to see if there was a spot where it would be 
easy to draw blood," not in response that he actually draw the blood. Aplt. Brf. at 
12. She argues that Davis "tricked her into surrendering her arm on the pretense 
that he would only check to see if there [was] a suitable vein." Aplt. Brf. at 22. Had 
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Davis immediately drawn the blood after applying the tourniquet without further 
comment, defendant's claim might have some weight. However, he did not. After 
applying the tourniquet, Davis advised defendant that it was an "easy site" and that 
they "could go ahead and take care of this." R. 533: 95. After Davis said that it was 
an "easy site" and that they "could go ahead and take care of this," defendant did 
not protest or pull her arm away, and thus signaled her willingness to submit to the 
blood draw at that time. No trickery was involved. Davis simply addressed her 
fear using a step-by-step approach. 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's finding that she did not try to 
withdraw her arm and did not say "no" or "stop." Aplt. Brf. at 12-13. Defendant 
contends, however, that she was still panicky and afraid of the needles. Aplt. Brf. at 
13. The State acknowledges that defendant was still fearful of the needle and upset 
at the prospect of the blood draw. For this reason, the victim advocate held her 
hand during the process and Officer Monson shielded her eyes from the needle. R. 
533: 67. The trial court also implicitly recognized this fact, finding that "[w]hen the 
blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm and stated that the 
experience was not as bad as she thought it would be." R. 159, ^ 17 (emphasis 
added). She nevertheless overcame that fear, offered her arm, and did not 
withdraw her arm or otherwise protest when Davis said they "could go ahead and 
take care of this." R. 533: 95. 
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Defendant, however, contends that her consent was involuntary because 
Davis, Cecelia Budd (the blood technician), and Officer Monson "were physically 
restraining her during the blood draw/7 Aplt. Brf. at 11, 22. This allegation is not 
supported by the facts. Davis held her arm in order to apply the tourniquet. R. 525: 
270-71. Cecelia Budd, the victim advocate, kneeled beside defendant, not to detain 
her, but to calm her. R. 533: 75, 86, 95. As Davis applied the tourniquet to 
defendant, Budd held her other hand and defendant squeezed Budd's hand in 
return. R. 533: 80. Budd told defendant to look at her, not at the needle, and to take 
a deep breath. R. 533: 80. Officer Monson, who was standing in plain clothes 
outside the car, also shielded defendant's eyes from the needle. R. 533: 67. No one 
was physically restraining her. 
Nor was defendant "pulling away" while being "secured." Aplt. Brf. at 11, 
13. As noted, she was not being physically secured by others. Moreover, she was 
not "pulling away" in an effort to avoid the blood draw, as defendant suggests. In 
response to a question about defendant's "body language" during the blood draw, 
Officer Monson testified that "[s]he was pulling away" and "crying," but he also 
testified that she "offered her arm." R. 533:67. Given her fear of needles, defendant 
may very well have pulled or leaned away with her body while offering her arm for 
the blood draw. Such would be a natural response from someone who feared 
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needles. The "pulling away" body language was also the likely result of her turning 
her eyes from the needle, as counseled by Budd. 
In sum, the evidence at the suppression hearing does not support defendant's 
contention that her consent "was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in 
submission to a claim of lawful authority." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233. The court's 
conclusion of voluntary consent is further buttressed by Davis's admonition to 
defendant that she had the right to refuse the blood draw and that it was "a decision 
she had to make on her own," R. 533: 93. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 59, n.6. 
B. Defendant's consent was not obtained by police exploitation of a 
prior illegality. 
Defendant claims that even if her consent was voluntary, it is invalid, arguing 
that it was obtained by exploitation of a prior police illegality. Aplt. Brf. at 14-18,22-
23. Specifically, defendant contends that she was unlawfully arrested without 
probable cause. Aplt. Brf. at 14-18. This claim fails. 
1. Defendant's detention in the unmarked patrol car was 
supported by probable cause. 
An arrest or custodial detention "is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being 
committed." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,152 (2004). And under section 77-7-2 
of the Utah Code, an officer may make a warrantless arrest when he or she "has 
reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A misdemeanor has been committed 
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and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested committed it." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-7-2(1) (West 2004). Contrary to defendant's claim, the facts known 
by police at the time of the investigation were sufficient to establish probable cause, 
justifying the custodial detention of defendant. 
The intersection where the accident occurred was governed by a two-way 
stop sign for traffic on the Old Bingham Highway that gave the right of way to 
traffic on Highway U-lll . See SE4, 5, & 34; R. 533: 57, 59. Defendant told Officer 
Saunders that she stopped at the stop sign, but then proceeded to cross the 
intersection. R. 533: 57. When she did so, she collided with the motorcycle driven 
by Mr. Pracht. R. 533: 57. Although defendant told Officer Saunders that she did 
not see Mr. Pracht (until after she hit him), nothing appeared to obstruct her view. 
R. 533: 57. There were no buildings, trees, or bushes that impeded her line of sight 
to the motorcycle. R. 533: 58. And although the sun was setting, it was not in 
defendant's eyes. R. 533: 59. These facts created probable cause to believe that 
defendant failed to yield the right of way to Mr. Pracht, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. 41-6-72.10(3) (West 2004) (making it a class C misdemeanor if driver fails to 
"yield the right-of-way to any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another 
roadway so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when the 
operator is moving across or within the intersection or junction of roadways"). 
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Additionally, officers knew that the injuries suffered by Mr. Pracht were 
likely to result in his death. R. 533: 9. He was "near death" when he was life 
flighted to the hospital. R. 533: 9. This fact, together with defendant's failure to 
yield the right of way, established probable cause that defendant was guilty of at 
least negligent homicide, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 (West 2004) 
(making it a class A misdemeanor when a person acts with criminal negligence and 
causes the death of another). Although additional facts may have been required to 
support a conviction for negligent homicide, see State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, \ 
18, 999 P.2d 1252 (requiring more than mere advertence), the failure to yield, 
together with the unobstructed view, daylight hour, and clearly marked stop sign, 
was sufficient to establish probable cause of negligent homicide. 
Additionally, and contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, police had 
probable cause to believe that defendant was under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, and hence, probable cause to believe that he was guilty of automobile 
homicide. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (West 2004). Officer Roberts testified that 
when he first observed defendant, he noticed that she was shaking and nervous, and 
that her eyes were red, but attributed it to the emotional trauma of the accident. R. 
533: 11. However, as he conversed with defendant over the next 45 minutes, he 
suspected that she was impaired. R. 533:14. He explained that although he did not 
see her cry, the redness in her eyes did not dissipate as he would expect if it had 
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been caused from crying. R. 533: 14, 36-37. He also noted that she was smoking 
continually and did not seem to exhibit a concern for the victim. R. 533:14. 
Defendant discounts this testimony, arguing that "[h]er red eyes, crying, 
smoking and nervousness were all consistent with the facts that she had just been 
involved in a fatal traffic accident....,/ Aplt. Brf. at 16.5 She also argues that "[h]er 
prolonged crying refutes the notion that she did not feel bad about the accident." 
Aplt. Brf. at lb. Defendant's condition may very well have been susceptible to an 
innocent explanation. But as observed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 
"probable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal 
activity, not an actual showing of such activity." 462 U.S. 213,243,245 n.13 (1983). 
As a result, "innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a showing of 
probable cause; to require otherwise would be to sub silentio impose a drastically 
more rigorous definition of probable cause than the security of our citizens 
demand/' Id. 
5
 Continuing, defendant contends that her emotional state was also consistent 
with "having been informed by the police that she had just killed a man and could 
not refuse their demand that she submit to a blood draw, which they would force if 
necessary, despite her profound fear of needles." Aplt. Brf. at 16. As noted above, 
however, police did not tell defendant that she could not refuse the blood draw. In 
fact, the blood technician, Davis, told her she had the right to refuse the blood draw. 
R. 533: 93-94. 
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Initially, Officer Roberts attributed defendant's condition to the emotional 
trauma of the accident, but after observing her for some 45 minutes, concluded that 
it suggested intoxication. He testified that based on his experience, he would have 
expected the redness in her eyes to dissipate. The water in her eyes cleared, but the 
redness did not. He also noted that she was smoking continually. Although 
defendant may have been smoking to calm her nerves, she may also have been 
smoking to mask an odor of alcohol. Courts have repeatedly been counseled to 
'"accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and 
suspicious actions.'" State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f 11, 112 P.3d 507 (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262,1268 (10th Or. 2001)); accord United States v. 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,273 (2002) ("allow[ing] officers to draw on their own experience 
and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the 
cumulative information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained 
person'"). 
Defendant contends that her detention was nevertheless unlawful because the 
officers "incorrectly] belie[ved] that blood draws are routinely taken in serious 
accidents, and that the police had the legal right to demand a blood sample from 
Tripp as a result of the implied consent statute." Aplt. Brf. at 16 (internal citations to 
record omitted). But an officer's understanding of the law, whether correct or 
mistaken, has no bearing on the lawfulness of an arrest or custodial detention. In 
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Devenpeck v. Alford, the United States Supreme Court made "clear that an arresting 
officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the 
existence of probable cause/' 543 U.S. 146,153 (2004). This is true even if the officer 
has communicated to the suspect his mistaken reason for making the arrest. Id. at 
153-55. Accordingly, an officer's "subjective reason for making [an] arrest need not 
be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provided probable cause/7 Id. 
As repeatedly explained by the Supreme Court ," ' "the fact that the officer does not 
have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal 
justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the 
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." ' " Id. at 153 (quoting Whren 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,813 (1996) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 
138 (1978)). 
In sum, defendant's failure to yield to the motorcyclist under conditions that 
would suggest she could clearly see him, together with her condition as assessed by 
Officer Roberts, created probable cause to believe she may have been intoxicated. 
Accordingly, defendant's detention was lawful and her consent was valid. 
2, Even assuming the detention was unlawful, police did not 
exploit that detention to obtain defendant's consent. 
Even assuming the detention was unlawful, any taint from the unlawful 
detention was sufficiently attenuated to remove any taint. 
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In determining whether a police illegality has tainted a subsequent consent, "a 
court 'evaluates the relationship between official misconduct and subsequently 
discovered evidence to determine if excluding the evidence will effectively deter 
future illegalities/" Hansen, 2002 UT125, at ]f 62 (quoting State v. Shoulderblad, 905 
P.2d 289,292 (Utah 1995)). Three factors "have particular relevance" in making this 
assessment: "(1) the 'purpose and flagrancy' of the illegal conduct, (2) 'the presence 
of intervening circumstances/ and (3) the 'temporal proximity' between the illegal 
detention and consent." Id. at \ 64 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 
(1975)). 
The State concedes that the third factor — the temporal proximity between the 
detention and consent—would weigh in favor of suppression. Only some 15 
minutes elapsed between the time defendant was escorted to the unmarked patrol 
car and her consent to Brian Davis. See R. 533: 93; Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at f^ 69 
(holding that "'[a] brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and 
consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not 
had time to dissipate'") (quoting Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293). The other two 
factors, however, mitigate against suppression. 
Defendant suggests that the very purpose of her detention was to obtain her 
consent. See Aplt. Brf. at 22-23. Under such circumstances, "suppressing evidence 
derived from the illegal conduct 'clearly will have a deterrent effect.'" Hansen, 2002 
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UT 125, at | 65 (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264). The facts, however, do not 
support defendant's claim. After concluding that defendant would not consent to a 
blood draw, Officer Roberts detained her not to compel her consent, but to secure 
her until he obtained a warrant for the blood draw. See R. 533: 32. He did not 
follow through with the blood draw only because Davis, who arrived shortly after 
defendant was placed in the car, subsequently obtained her consent. R. 533: 18. 
Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 23, police did not flagrantly violate 
defendant's rights, but acted in an effort to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that " [intervening 
circumstances ... include such events as an officer telling a person he or she has the 
right to refuse consent or to consult with an attorney." Hansen, 2002 UT 125, at \ 68. 
Such an admonition was given here. Before obtaining her consent, Davis advised 
defendant that she had the right to refuse consent and told her that it was "a 
decision she had to make on her own/7 R. 533:93. He also advised her that she had 
the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. R. 533: 93. Even after being so 
advised, defendant consented. 
In sum, although only a brief time elapsed between the detention and consent, 
suppression is not warranted because the officers detention was not flagrant, but for 
the purpose of securing her until a warrant was obtained, and because Davis 
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advised her that she had the right to refuse consent and the right to counsel, an 
intervening act that effectively purged any taint. 
C. In any event, the blood evidence would have inevitably been 
discovered. 
Even assuming arguendo that the consent was not voluntarily given, or that 
the consent was the product of an unlawful detention, the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress should nevertheless be affirmed under the 
inevitable discovery doctrine. 
One of the exceptions to the "harsh consequences" of the exclusionary rule 
("excluding relevant evidence of illegal activity at trial") is the inevitable discovery 
doctrine. State v. Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, ^ f 13-14, 76 P.3d 1159. "The inevitable 
discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from 
the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if 
in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it 
inevitably would have been discovered/" Id. at ^ 14 (quoting Murray v. United 
States, 487 U.S. 533,539 (1988)). Topanotes thus explained that "[a] crucial element of 
inevitable discovery is independence; there must be some 'independent basis for 
discovery7 and 'the investigation that inevitably would have led to the evidence 
[must] be independent of the constitutional violation.'" Id. at Tf 16 (citations 
omitted). In other words, "'the fact or likelihood that makes the discovery 
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inevitable [must] arise from circumstances other than those disclosed by the illegal 
search itself.'" Id. (citation omitted). To prevail on a claim of inevitable discovery, 
therefore, the State must identify "persuasive evidence of events or circumstances 
apart from those resulting in illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to 
discovery/7 Id. 
In this case, Officer Roberts testified that he did not follow through with the 
warrant because Davis arrived and subsequently obtained defendant's consent. R. 
533:18. Had Davis not obtained defendant's consent, Officer Roberts would have 
thus followed through with the warrant procedure. In addition to the facts 
personally known to him, he would have talked with others on the scene who had 
contact with defendant. Among those people was Cecelia Budd, the victim 
advocate who sat with defendant throughout the investigation. She smelled the 
odor of alcohol when she first leaned into the car where defendant was sitting. R. 
533: 76, 83. This added fact would be more than sufficient to support a probable 
cause finding for the issuance of the warrant (even if it could not be conclusively 
determined whether the odor came from defendant's person or the car). 
Importantly, Budd did not keep her observation to herself, but reported it to one of 
the officers on the scene. See R. 533:84 (responding in the affirmative when asked if 
she "reported] to Officer Roberts or any other police officer that [she] detected an 
odor of alcohol in that car"). Officer Roberts specifically testified that to get a 
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warrant he would "have to review all the information with the officers at the scene/7 
R. 533:18. Moreover, when Budd joined defendant in the patrol car, she smelled 
alcohol emanating from defendant's person, confirming that the alcohol she smelled 
while defendant was in the S.U. V. was coming from her. R. 158: If8; R. 533:78-79,86-
87. Additionally, Budd noticed that defendant slurred her words when she spoke, 
but admitted that she did not know how defendant normally speaks. R. 533: 84. 
Thus, to the extent that Officer Roberts' own observations were insufficient to 
establish probable cause, the added information obtained through Budd would have 
been sufficient to support a probable cause finding and the issuance of a warrant. 
Because Officer Roberts would have sought the warrant but for Davis's 
representation that he obtained defendant's consent, the evidence from the blood 
draw would have inevitably been discovered. 
D. Alternatively, the blood draw was justified under the exigent 
circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. 
This Court "may affirm a trial court's judgment on an alternative ground ... if 
the alternative ground is 'apparent on the record' and 'sustainable by the factual 
findings of the trial court.'" State v. Henderson, 2007 UT App 125, If 15,159 P.3d 397 
(quoting Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, f 9). In this case, Officer Roberts was also justified 
in forcing a blood draw under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
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To justify a warrantless blood draw under the exigent circumstances 
exception, the State must first demonstrate probable cause of intoxication. See State 
v. Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, ^ 15-29, 156 P.3d 77. "[PJrobable cause to conduct a 
[blood draw] ha[s] to be grounded on something more than mere suspicion/7 Id. at 
f 24. Instead, "sufficient probable cause [is] present only where there [is] a 'clear 
indication that... evidence will be found/" Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 
762 (1985)). Given Officer Roberts's personal observations and assessment of 
defendant, Cecelia Budd's observations, including the odor of alcohol emanating 
from defendant's person, and defendant's failure to yield the right of way to Mr. 
Pracht, the likelihood that the blood draw would detect evidence of alcohol use and 
impairment was great and thus satisfied the probable cause requirement. 
The State must next demonstrate the existence of exigent circumstances. 
"Whether exigent circumstances exist to justify a warrantless blood draw "depends 
on 'all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the 
search or seizure itself/" Rodriguez, 2007 UT 15, \ 51 (quoting United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,537 (1985)). Relevant factors include the time it 
would take to obtain a warrant, the availability of a telephonic warrant, and the 
ongoing nature of the investigation. See id. at ^ 11,54. In this case, Officer Roberts 
testified that it would take "a couple of hours" to obtain a warrant because he 
would "have to review all the information with the officers at the scene, ... call 
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another detective to come and help [him] draft the warrant and go with [him] to 
review the warrant with the district attorney and then have it signed by a district 
court judge/' R. 533: 18-19. He did not discuss the availability of a telephonic 
warrant. Moreover, the accident occurred just before 7:00 p.m. on a Friday evening, 
see R. 533: 5, when the courts would be closed. 
Most significantly, as in Rodriguez, "[o]ne fact dominates all others with 
respect to its relevance to whether the warrantless blood draw was reasonable: that 
[the victim] was expected to succumb to [his] injuries/' Rodriguez, 2007 UT15, *f 57. 
"This fact significantly alter[s] the warrant acquisition calculus that a reasonable law 
enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe an alcohol-related offense has 
occurred could be expected to apply." Id. The seriousness of the accident, together 
with the strong evidence of defendant's alcohol impairment, was "sufficient to 
establish that the interests of law enforcement outweighed ... [defendant's] privacy 
interests," justifying a warrantless blood draw under the exigent circumstances 
exception. Id. at f^ 60. 
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II. 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION 
ON SUPERSEDING CAUSE 
Defendant maintains that any negligence by her was not the proximate cause 
of the accident, but asserts instead "that [the victim's] negligence was the 
superseding cause of the accident." Aplt. Brf. at 26. Specifically, she alleges that the 
victim (1) "may have been speeding, and this may have been the cause of the 
accident," (2) improperly braked, causing him to slide into her truck rather than 
stop or steer around it, and (3) was not wearing his helmet. Aplt. Brf. at 28-29. 
Defendant contends that the instructions given to the jury foreclosed his argument 
that defendant's negligence was the superseding cause of the accident, absolving 
her of any liability. Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. She argues that the alleged faulty 
instructions thus "violated [her] constitutional right to present her defense, and in 
insulating the Government's causation case from scrutiny, undercut the 
Government's burden of proof and [defendant's] presumption of innocence." Aplt. 
Brf. at 30. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A, This Court should not address defendant's challenge to the 
instructions because she failed to preserve her claim that the 
instructions were inadequate. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised 
on appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 1} 11,10 P.3d 346. This rule serves two 
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important functions: (1) it gives the trial court "an opportunity to address a claimed 
error and, if appropriate, correct it," and (2) it prevents a defendant from foregoing 
an objection "with the strategy of 'enhancing] the defendant's chances of acquittal 
and then, if that strategy fails, ... claim[ing] on appeal that the Court should 
reverse/" Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted). A review of the record below 
reveals that defendant did not preserve his challenge to the jury instructions and 
this court is thus precluded from addressing his challenge on appeal. 
After defendant testified, the trial court briefly discussed some of the 
instructions with counsel. R. 527: 682-87. When defense counsel asserted that they 
had already fully discussed the issue of contributory negligence, the trial court 
disagreed and invited counsel to state his position. R. 527: 684. Counsel generally 
asserted that he should be able to argue to the jury that the victim's alleged 
speeding, failure to yield, and failure to wear a helmet caused his death. R. 527:684-
85. He maintained that" [i]f indeed there were other forces that actually caused the 
death, that takes away [the State's] requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
that [defendant] is the negligent factor that set the events in motion." R. 527: 685. 
Defendant did not object to Instructions 30 or 34, which he now challenges on 
appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 30, nor to any other specific instruction. 
The trial court responded that the instructions, as presently written, stated 
that defendant's negligence "does not need to be the sole cause, that there may be 
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other factors or other causes involved as long as those other causes do not disrupt 
the continuous and natural sequence of events/7 R. 527: 686. The court then 
paraphrased defendant's concerns about the instructions and stated its belief that 
they in fact allowed him to make his argument to the jury: 
What you're suggesting is that these other causes that you7ve described 
that you would argue, the speed, the helmet, [etc.], if the jury believed 
that those were sufficient to constitute intervening causes or 
superseding causes that would disrupt the natural sequence of events, 
then she shouldn't be, even though she may have been negligent to 
begin with, we have these what I would call intervening causes. I think 
the jury instructions use the word superseding causes. I don't think, 
the way the jury instructions are written now, would rule out an argue 
[sic] that these other charges are superseding causes. I think you can 
make that argument. The jury will have to determine whether they're 
superseding, whether they would interfere with the natural sequence 
of events. 
R. 527: 685-86. Defense counsel indicated that he "underst[oo]d" and represented 
that the court had accurately expressed his position. R. 527: 686. The court then 
invited defense counsel to introduce any clarifying instruction he thought necessary, 
but rather than taking that opportunity, counsel simply thanked the court: 
The Court: I think that's the way I've seen the instructions and 
that the way it seems to me that they should be. If 
there's an additional instruction that the defense 
would want or some other clarifying instruction, I'd 
like to see it but I think right now, the way the 
instructions are written-
Mr. Yengich: Cover that issue. 
The Court: I think they cover the issue and I think it enables you 
to make the argument. 
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Mr. Yengich: Thank you, Your Honor. 
R. 527: 626. Defendant never submitted an additional clarifying instruction. 
Although defendant initially complained that the instructions did not allow 
him to argue his theory of the case, he abandoned his objection when the court 
invited him to submit a clarifying instruction and he failed to submit it. See State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f 13, 61 P.3d 1062 (holding an issue unpreserved where 
defendant failed to follow up on court's invitation to raise the issue after State 
provided additional discovery).6 Moreover, defense counsel's exchange with the 
trial court signaled that he was in fact satisfied with the court's explanation. He 
finished the court's thought, thanked the court, and then never requested an 
additional clarifying instruction. This was tantamount to invited error. See State v. 
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 54, 70 P.3d 111 ("[I]f counsel, either by statement or act, 
affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury 
instruction, [the Court] will not review the instruction under the manifest injustice 
exception."). This Court, therefore, is precluded from addressing defendant's 
challenge to the instructions. 
6
 Defendant may be excused from the requirements of the preservation rule if 
she "can demonstrate that "exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74,111. However, because defendant has not argued 
on appeal that plain error or exceptional circumstances exist, this Court is precluded 
from addressing them. See State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287,1292 (Utah App. 1994). 
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B. Defendant's challenge to the jury instructions also fails on the 
merits. 
Assuming arguendo that defendant's challenge to the instructions was 
preserved below, his claim fails on the merits. The law is well settled that "[a] 
defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the case to the jury and to 
have the jury instructed accordingly." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, If 21,52 P.3d 1210. 
The trial court, however, "is not required to give any requested jury instruction if it 
does not comport with the facts or does not accurately state the applicable law." 
State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 655 (Utah), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858 (1995). Nor is the 
trial court required to give a proposed instruction '"if the point is properly covered 
in the other instructions/" State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah App. 1997) 
(quoting Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238). In other words, where factually supported, a 
defendant "is entitled to have the gist of his defense reflected in the instructions," 
but the "precise wording and specificity is left to the sound discretion of the trial 
court." State v. Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989). 
Defendant's claim fails in the first instance because the facts presented at trial 
did not support his theory of a superseding cause. First, although the evidence 
suggests that the victim was not wearing a helmet, no evidence was introduced 
suggesting that he would have survived the accident had he been wearing a helmet. 
See R. 527: 705. Second, the only credible evidence regarding speed showed that the 
37 
victim was traveling the speed limit. Officer Roberts testified that the speed limit 
for the victim was 60 miles per hour, R. 526: 425-28, and the accident investigator 
testified that the victim was traveling between 59.8 and 60.37 miles per hour when 
he began to brake. R. 526:475-77.7 A witness of the accident also confirmed that the 
victim "appeared to be driving safely, the speed limit." R. 525:177-79.8 And finally, 
no evidence was presented at trial supporting defendant's claim that the victim 
would have avoided the accident had he applied both the front and back brakes.9 
Because defendant's theory of a superseding or intervening cause for the accident 
was not supported by the facts, he was not entitled to an instruction on this theory. 
7
 Defendant points to testimony indicating that the victim "may have been 
going faster/7 Aplt. Brf. at 28 (citing R. 526: 505,514). The testimony, however, was 
that the victim may have been going faster if he was applying both his front and rear 
brakes. R. 526: 505, 514-15. But as acknowledged by defendant in his brief, "[t]he 
physical evidence showed that prior to the collision, [the victim] was applying only 
his rear brake/' Aplt. Brf. at 28 (citing R. 526: 475). 
8
 The only suggestion at trial that the speed limit was 50 m.p.h. came in 
response to cross-examination questions from defense counsel. See R. 525:177-78; R. 
526: 510, 517. At a prior hearing, Officer Roberts had indicated that the speed limit 
was 50 m.p.h., but clarified at trial that the speed limit changed to 50 m.p.h. for 
southbound traffic on Highway U - l l l immediately after its intersection with the 
Old Bingham Highway. See R. 526: 426-27. 
9
 In his brief, defendant cites to the preliminary hearing transcript in support 
of this proposition. Aplt. Brf. at 29 (citing R. 532: 37-39). He does not cite to 
anything to that effect in the trial record and the State has found none. Moreover, at 
the preliminary hearing, Officer Roberts, who was not qualified as an expert in the 
physics and operation of motorcycles, conceded only that "[p]erhaps" the victim 
would have stopped the motorcycle in time had he been traveling 50 m.p.h. See R. 
532: 39. 
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See Carter, 888 P.2d at 655 (holding that a trial court "is not required to give any 
requested jury instruction if it does not comport with the facts''). 
Even if the evidence had supported defendant's claim that the victim was 
speeding, that a helmet would have prevented life-threatening injuries, or that 
applying both brakes would have stopped the motorcycle before colliding, 
defendant would still not have been entitled to a superseding cause instruction. 
Utah cases addressing the doctrine of intervening cause follow the common law: 
"An intervening, independent agency will not exonerate [the] accused 
for criminal liability from a victim's death unless the death is solely 
attributable to the secondary agency, and not at all induced by the 
primary one. To qualify as an intervening cause an event must be 
unforeseeable and one in which [the] accused does not participate; an 
intervening cause must be so extraordinary that it is unfair to hold [the] 
accused responsible for the death." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1215 (Utah 1993) (quoting 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 6, at 363 
(1991)). As aptly explained by the Connecticut Supreme Court, an intervening cause 
"does more than supply a concurring or contributing cause of the injury, but is 
unforeseeable and sufficiently powerful in its effect that it serves to relieve the 
defendant of criminal responsibility for his conduct." State v. Munoz, 659 A.2d 683, 
692 (Conn. 1995). 
"The fact that a vehicle may be coming around the bend or over the hill ... 
and may be speeding is foreseeable." State v. Ynocenscio, 773 So.2d 613, 615 (Fla. 
App. 2000). It is likewise foreseeable that a motorcyclist will not be wearing a 
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helmet, especially where he has no duty under the law to wear a helmet. Finally, 
that a motorcyclist may improperly brake in response to another vehicle's 
maneuvers is also foreseeable. In short, none of the victim's actions "'are so 
extraordinary that it is unfair to hold [defendant] responsible for the death/" Dunn, 
850 P.2d at 1215 (citation omitted). 
This case is governed by State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983). Hamblin 
began to accelerate through an intersection to beat a red light and, in so doing, hit 
and killed the victim as he attempted to make a left hand turn at that same 
intersection. Id. at 377. Hamblin claimed that the victim was negligent in making 
the turn and that he was thus entitled to an instruction on superseding intervening 
cause. Id. at 379. The Utah Supreme Court rejected Hamblin's argument, observing 
that he was "clearly negligent" in trying to beat the light and " [h]is negligent course 
of conduct was active and continuous up to the time of the collision." Id. The Court 
noted that had Hamblin not accelerated to beat the light, he would have been able to 
stop before hitting the victim and "was thus the cause of the collision." Id. The 
Court explained that the victim's "negligence, if any, could only have been a 
concurrent cause and not a superseding one; it could not insulate [Hamblin] from 
criminal culpability for causing [the victim's] death." Id. 
Likewise, defendant was clearly negligent in not yielding the right of way to 
Mr. Pracht and defendant's "negligent course of conduct was active and continuous 
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up to the time of the collision/' Id. Had defendant not pulled into the intersection, 
Mr. Pracht would have proceeded untouched. Therefore, Mr. Pracht's "negligence, 
if any, could only have been a concurrent cause and not a superseding one; it could 
not insulate [defendant] from criminal culpability for causing [Mr. Pracht's] death/7 
Id.; see also State v. Lawson, 913 A.2d 494, 500 (Conn. App. 2007) (concluding that 
motorcyclist's speeding and skidding "reasonably could only be concurrent causes 
rather than unforeseen events that occurred subsequent to the defendant's negligent 
act of turning left into the victim's line of travel at the intersection"); State v. Hallett, 
619 P.2d 335, 338 (Utah 1980) (holding that the victim's speeding was not a 
superseding cause because she likely would have stopped had defendant not 
pushed down the stop sign). 
C. In any event, any error in the instructions was harmless. 
In any event, the instructions did not, as defendant contends, foreclose 
defendant from arguing that the victim's negligence was the sole proximate, or 
intervening, cause of his death. Aplt. Brf. at 29-30. Accordingly, defendant suffered 
no harm. 
As noted, the trial court concluded that defendant could in fact argue that the 
victim's actions were the sole proximate cause of his death and defendant made that 
argument using the instructions. Instruction No. 34 correctly stated that" [t]he fact 
that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility, 
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provided such other causes are not the sole proximate cause of the death/' R. 340 (emphasis 
added); see Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1215 (holding that "[a]n intervening, independent 
agency will not exonerate [the] accused for criminal liability from a victim's death 
unless the death is solely attributable to the secondary agency, and not at all 
induced by the primary one"). During closing, defense counsel agreed that this 
instruction correctly stated the law and used them to argue that the victim's 
negligence was the sole proximate or superseding cause of his death: 
[A]s I begin my remarks we differ totally on this idea of what the 
causation was and I want to read you something because she's read it 
and you can turn to it, it's Instruction No. 34. "It is not required that 
the defendant's actions be the direct cause of the victim's death." 
Agree with that. "It is sufficient that they caused the death indirectly 
through a chain of natural effects and causes unchanged by human 
nature." Agree with that. "The fact that other causes contribute to the 
death does not relieve the actor of responsibility." The Court has given 
you the proper instruction. But what counsel for the state forgot to 
emphasize to you is, "providing such other causes are not the sole 
proximate cause of death." I want to talk to you about it. 
R. 527: 742-43. Counsel then argued that the victim's failure to wear a helmet "was 
the sole proximate cause of his death." R. 527: 743. Counsel also argued that 
defendant's failure to see the victim did not constitute negligence. R. 527: 747. He 
argued that" [h]ad [the victim] been going 50, there would have been no accident." 
R. 527: 751-52. He also argued that the victim may have made a mistake "by only 
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hitting one of the brakes/' R. 527: 749. Any error in the instructions, therefore, was 
harmless under any standard.10 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted September 28, 2007. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEF£R^Y S. GRAY 
stant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
10 Defendant claims that the State would be required to show that the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but cites no authority in support of this 
claim. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SUSAN TRIP P, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCUSIONS OF LAW 
OSiH 0 330O 
Case No. Q4WQ4951 
Judge John Paul Kennedy 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, having come before this Court for 
hearing in the above entitled manner on February 25, 2005, and Oral Argument on April 
18, 2005, in which Defendant was represented by counsel, Barton J. Warren, and the 
State was represented by co-counsel, Kim Cordova and Sandi Johnson. The Court having 
reviewed the parties' written briefs and considered oral arguments of counsel, the Court 
now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The defendant was involved in an auto-motorcycle accident, which resulted in 
the death of Daniel Pracht. 
2. The defendant was asked to submit to a chemical test and stated that officers 
could test her blood if they did not use a needle. 
3. The defendant's initial refusal to take a blood test was based solely on her fear 
of needles. 
4. When speaking with Officer Saunders, the defendant denied using alcohol or 
drugs and expressed her fear of needles. 
5. Detective Roberts talked with the defendant multiple times. The more he 
spoke with the victim, the more concerned he became that she was impaired 
by something. 
6. Detective Roberts based his assessment on the fact that the redness of the 
defendant's eyes did not dissipate with time, she was nervous, she appeared to 
lack concern for the victim, and she was smoking heavily. 
7. No officer detected the odor of alcohol on the defendant, nor did they observe 
any obvious signs of impairment, such as poor balance or slurred speech. 
8. The victim advocate, Cecelia Budd, detected an odor of alcohol on the 
defendant while the defendant was seated in a family car. 
9. The defendant was eventually placed in Detective Roberts un-marked vehicle 
and secluded from her family and friends because they were interfering with 
the investigation. 
10. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was seated in Detective Roberts 
unmarked vehicle. The defendant was seated halfway in the vehicle, with the 
door open and her legs outside the vehicle. 
11. At the time of the blood draw, the defendant was not handcuffed or shackled. 
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12. At the time of the blood draw, Mr. Davis and Cecelia Budd were present, and 
neither was in uniform or armed. Officer Monson was also nearby, but he was 
not in uniform. 
13. Mr. Davis, the blood technician, spoke to the defendant about a blood draw 
and Mr. Davis could detect an odor of alcohol from the defendant. 
14. Mr. Davis reviewed with the defendant her right to remain silent, her right to 
counsel, and her right to refuse the test. 
15. When asked by Mr. Davis if she would consent to the blood draw, the 
defendant voluntarily extended her arm. 
16. When Mr. Davis drew the defendant's blood, she never tried to withdraw her 
arm and she never said "no" or "stop." 
17. When the blood draw was over, the defendant was immediately calm and 
stated that the experience was not as bad as she thought it would be. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant's initial refusal was based solely on her fear of needles, and 
the evidence demonstrates that at the time of the blood draw the defendant's 
fear was resolved. 
2. The defendant voluntarily consented to a blood draw. 
3. The evidence obtained as a result of the blood draw is admissible. 
DATED this 7b day of Me$, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
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